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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
“Precision Scheduled Railroading” (PSR) is a concept that has been closely associated
with the late railway magnate E. Hunter Harrison. More than just scheduling terminal-toterminal trips for trains, PSR creates entire point-to-point trip plans for individual railroad
shipments. Service failures can result if there is a mismatch between demand and the
amount of capacity provided. Prior research suggests that “precision execution” of freight
trains is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for achieving service reliability. Since the
concept was first put into practice, the benefits to shipment arrival reliability and to freight
railroads’ profitability has been demonstrated by several Class One freight railroads where
it has been implemented. However, the effects of the “Precision Scheduled Railroad”
operating strategy to passenger railway operations in shared freight/passenger corridors
has not been studied in detail.
This paper researches the effects of the PSR approach in the context of passenger
railways. The key measures examined are “Host Railroad Minutes of Delay per 10,000
Train-Miles” and “On-Time Performance” of individual passenger railways for both intercity
passenger railways and high-speed rail.
The results concerning “Host Railroad Minutes of Delay per 10,000 Train-Miles” suggest that
PSR may be able to reduce delays of the Amtrak passenger trains that it hosts. However,
the “On-Time Performance” results suggest that PSR strategies have the potential to
worsen a host railroad’s performance. Taken together, the results of the study suggest that
if implemented properly, PSR strategies will have no effect on a freight railroad’s ability to
host Amtrak intercity and high-speed rail passenger railway service, but that if implemented
incorrectly, the host railroad can negatively affect Amtrak’s train performance.

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

2

I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1971, intercity passenger railway service in the United States has been provided
almost entirely by Amtrak, including North America’s one high-speed rail line, Acela. Unlike
passenger railways in most nations, Amtrak rents its tracks from freight railway owners,
paying annually roughly $142 million to these “Host Railroads,” who dispatch the trains
that run on their tracks. (1) Because who controls the dispatching of trains determines
which trains have priority over others on a line, the operating strategies of the host freight
railroads have a significant impact on the on-time performance of Amtrak’s passenger
trains. For years, Amtrak officials have been dissatisfied with the excessive delays in its
passenger railway service that were caused by the host railroads. (2) So, in March of 2020,
the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) met with stakeholders and proposed a new
minimum performance standard for its host railroads of 80% on-time trains. (3) Some key
statistics of Amtrak’s operations on the Class One freight railroads are shown in Table 1.
Table 1.

Data for Class One Freight Railroads Hosting Amtrak Intercity Passenger
Railway Service

Freight Railroad Name

Total Miles of
Track (2020)

Uses PSR (yes
or no)

Year Started
PSR

Miles of Amtrak Service

BNSF Railway

32,500

No

N/A

7,014

Canadian National Railway

20,400

Yes

1998

1,539

Canadian Pacific Railway

12,400

Yes

2012

675

CSX

21,000

Yes

2017

7,057

Norfolk Southern Railway

19,420

Yes

2018

3,056

Union Pacific Railroad

32,000

Yes

2018

6,460

TOTAL

137,720

25,801

NOTE: The Kansas City Southern Railway does not host Amtrak trains

Clearly Amtrak and the freight railways disagree on how to best run passenger and freight
trains on the same tracks in the shared railroading environment of the United States, but
with a new operating strategy that has gradually been adopted by most of the largest
freight railways in the United States over the past several years, “Precision Scheduled
Railroading” (PSR), there is potential for change.
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II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
In 1982, at its lowest point in market share of the US freight transportation market (4,010,592
million-ton-miles), railroads only transported 20.2% (810,000 million-ton-miles) of the freight,
while trucks transported 32.4% (1,300,863 million-ton-miles) of the freight. (4) Since that
low point for the railroads in the USA, academics and railroad managers have meticulously
studied how freight railroads operate, with the goal of developing the most efficient railroad
operations possible, in order to increase market share and keep it against competition from
trucks. One area where it was thought improvement could be made to return more freight to
railroads was improving on-time performance. In research by Edwin Kraft, a railroad network
simulation model was built to test the effect of various operating strategies on transit (freight
travel) time reliability. The study indicated that “precision execution of railroad shipments is a
necessary condition for achieving service reliability,” and “carriers have a financial incentive
to figure out how to schedule sufficient capacity to handle demand peaking.” The study then
concluded that “railroads must improve reliability, particularly on single railcar shipments, if
they hope to remain competitive with trucks in the future.” (5)
The natural next question is therefore, “what is the appropriate amount of railroad track,
other railway infrastructure, and railway equipment to provide sufficient capacity”? First, a
definition of railway line capacity is needed. One definition is that railway capacity is the
maximum number of trains that would be able to operate on a given railway infrastructure,
during a specific time interval, subject to the railway operating plan. Capacity analyses
are key to efficient train operations and have been calculated since the inception of the
railway industry. The goal of a capacity analysis is to determine the maximum number of
trains that can safely operate on a railway’s tracks and yards, over a certain pre-defined
length of time, given the operating conditions of that railroad. (5) In Kraft’s research, the
authors demonstrated that railway capacity is not constant, but rather it depends on how
the railway infrastructure is utilized. For example, the “Infrastructure Parameters,” the
signaling system’s block section lengths, whether a section of the route has single or double
tracks, and the condition the ties, rails, and ballast of the track structure, all have major
effects on maximum train speeds allowed and therefore the number and size of trains run
daily. “Traffic Parameters,” such as the mix of trains running on a line, the percentage of
trains that run according to regular timetables, and the prioritization and the total number
of train priority classes affect capacity in a significant manner. (Because high-priority trains
are given preferential treatment over lower priority trains, the total system delays increase;
therefore the greater number of priority classes, the less capacity is available.) Additionally,
“Operating Parameters” such as train stop time, time spent in yards and terminals, and the
reliability of service plans affect a railway line’s capacity. (6)
The track and yard infrastructure and the railway signaling system are both somewhat
straightforward elements to determine, but the railway equipment utilization can be more
difficult to assess. William Vantuono pointed out that equipment utilization has many facets
and covers everything from railcar design to the scheduling of trains, and train scheduling
is the most important part. (7)
The modern era of railroad scheduling started in the mid-1970s, when the Association
of American Railroads (AAR), the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and the
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) worked together to create an “operations/
service planning” computer model that would focus on service quality and make freight
railroad operations more efficient. The data inputs for the model were “origin-destination
traffic volumes,” throughput numbers for railyards, train schedules, and unit costs. The
outputs of the computer model were predictions of shipment “origin-destination trip times”
and transportation costs for a particular operating plan. (7) Several railroads took a strong
interest in the project and its lessons learned, including the BNSF, the Southern Pacific
Railroad, and the Illinois Central Railroad (where Hunter Harrison first became a Chief
Executive Officer).

PRECISION SCHEDULING RAILROADING DEFINED
Railroads have long desired to improve the reliability of delivery dates and times for
their customers’ shipments. Railway operations managers worked on developing sorting
concepts for railyards that would allow “time definite” service with a guaranteed delivery
date and time. By changing the way in which railcars were assigned to outgoing trains,
from “first-come-first-served” to ensuring connections of particular cars to specific trains,
it was postulated that service reliability could be improved. (8) What was needed was for
a Class One (major) freight railroad to put the various ideas and concepts together and
implement it as an operating strategy.
In 1998, the Canadian National Railway (CN) was deep in debt, and steadily losing market
share of the freight transportation business to the trucking industry. In that year, the CN
acquired the Illinois Central Railroad (IC), and with it, the IC’s CEO, E. Hunter Harrison,
who had already implemented the strategy of point-to-point trip plans for individual railcars,
now called Precision Scheduled Railroading, or PSR. After seeing the results of PSR at
the IC, the CEO of the CN at the time, Paul Tellier, made Harrison the Chief Operating
Officer of the CN, and PSR was begun at the CN. (9) PSR consists of seven principles
that allow a railroad to move the same amount of freight as with traditional methods, but
with fewer people and less equipment. PSR consists of seven principles: (1) minimizing
railcar dwell times in yards; (2) reducing railcar classifications; (3) using multiple traffic
outlets; (4) running fewer specialized and more “general purpose” trains, (5) balancing train
movements by direction; (6) minimizing locomotive power requirements; and (7) striving
for more smoothed-out, steady work. (10)
A goal of implementing PSR is to streamline operations using departure scheduling and
point-to-point delivery methods in order to improve service to customers. Before PSR,
most railroads used a “hub-and-spoke-system,” in which railcars enter a hub or terminal,
where they are placed on different trains and redirected to their respective destinations.
Railway operating strategy focused on moving long trains, maximizing capacity to yield the
efficiency of labor and motive power. Railroads would operate both unit (a single commodity)
and manifest (a variety of commodities) trains with unit trains being the preferred method.
This approach did not always achieve the best outcomes for the railroad and its customers,
because the strategy meant that if a train service headed to a specific destination city
did not meet specific length requirements for its scheduled day of departure, it could be
cancelled—the result being that railcars often sat for long periods of time in railyards,
thereby reducing the yards’ capacities.
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The Precision Scheduled Railroading concept replaced the “terminal-to-terminal” shipment
strategy with “loading-dock-to-loading-dock.” By employing such an operating method,
and sticking to its schedules, a railroad eliminates much railcar switching within its yards,
and hauls freight from origin to destination more quickly, thereby reducing dwell time of
equipment, which improves its asset utilization. (11) Departure scheduling requires trains
to leave on-time, regardless of whether a customer’s railcars are ready to depart with their
scheduled train or not. The combination of the departure scheduling and point-to-point
delivery is intended to allow railroads to maximize running time at lower operating costs.
Railroads using PSR strategies lower their operating costs through the elimination of jobs
thought to be not needed, and through sale of extra locomotives and railcars, as fewer
trains are run. Additionally, most of the major railroads running PSR have expanded upon
its cost-cutting efficiencies by eliminating many of their less profitable rail lines.

EXPERIENCES OF THE OTHER CLASS ONE RAILROADS
CP Railway
The Canadian Pacific Railway implemented Precision Scheduled Railroading in 2012,
when the Pershing Square Capital Management hedge fund, owners of a 14% share of the
railroad, replaced the CEO and Chairman of the Board with Hunter Harrison. (12) Harrison
instituted his PSR strategy and the operating ratio of the CP decreased from roughly 80%
to 70% in just one year’s time. Harrison’s asset utilization point of view was stated directly
in the book How We Work and Why when he said, “An asset is not an asset until it is put
to use. Until then it is a liability. Assets have to earn their keep.” (13) To get to that point,
Harrison let go 4,800 of the 19,500 employees who worked for CP when he joined the
company, sold 400 locomotives and 11,000 railcars, and closed numerous terminals. (14)
Since Hunter Harrison left CP in 2017, the railroad has continued with the PSR strategy
for railroads, having Keith Creel, Harrison’s protégé, succeeding him as the CP’s CEO.
CSX Railway
In 2017, Hunter Harrison left the CP Railway and joined CSX, becoming its CEO. One of
his first steps was to start consolidating trains into fewer, longer trains. Then three other
aspects of Precision Scheduled Railroading followed—roughly one-third of CSX’s 31,000
employees were let go, 900 locomotives and 26,000 railcars were done away with, and
less profitable rail lines were sold by the second quarter of the year 2017. (15) Hunter
Harrison passed away when he was only a few months on the job at CSX, and the railroad
is still working to find the best balance of PSR strategies. (16)
NS Railway
NS began developing its “Top21” PSR program in late 2018 as part of a strategy called
“Reimagine Possible.” This began with streamlining of terminal operations and in order to
speed the flow of rail cars from origins to customers. In mid-2019, NS launched TOP21,
a new operating plan that changed the way NS runs trains across the network, basically
running fewer, heavier trains, reducing railcar switching, and increasing network velocity.
When the program started, NS owned roughly 4,100 locomotives and employed 26,000
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people. (15) In a filing to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on April 9,
2020, NS stated that it had recently sold 300 locomotives, and intended to put another 400
locomotives up for sale. Also, as part of the “Reimagine Possible” initiative of PSR, NS let
go 3,500 of its 26,000 employees in the year of 2019-2020. (17) The company attributed
its decision to the introduction of precision scheduled railroading (PSR) in 2019, which
“continues to provide significant benefits to the network operations and has resulted in
excess capacity.” (18)
Union Pacific Railroad
As part of the PSR wave flowing through the industry, in 2018 the Union Pacific Railroad
instituted its “Unified Plan 2020,” which aims to cut the railroad’s operating ratio to 60% in
the course of two years by adopting PSR principles. Using a similar strategy to the CN, the
CP, and CSX, the Union Pacific plan focused on moving individual railcars rather than whole
trains, on minimizing car classification yard handling and dwell time, on balancing train
movements on their network to improve asset utilization, on running more general purpose
trains, and on increasing efficiencies by running longer trains with fewer locomotives and
employees. (19) In practice, this has meant that since August of 2018, the Union Pacific
has removed 1,500 locomotives and 30,000 railcars from service and eliminated the jobs
of 1,000 people. The primary reason for implementing PSR is to enable more efficient
train operations (thereby making more profit by doing less), but in early 2020, UP reversed
course and started re-establishing some services it had cut. (20)
Kansas City Southern Railway
In 2018, the Kansas City Southern Railway had its best year in terms of revenues and
earnings per share, but senior management thought the railroad could do better with a
different operating strategy. Additionally, KCS CEO Patrick Ottensmeyer has explained that
with its major interchange partner the Union Pacific Railroad now running PSR operating
strategies, it made business sense to match their way of operating. So, KCS decided to
implement their own brand of PSR in 2019. The KCS form of PSR aims for operational
excellence and is intended to drive the following improvements: to improve and sustain
consistency and reliability of customer service; to facilitating growth by providing additional
capacity to pursue new opportunities; to improve asset utilization; and to improve the
profitability of the company. In one year’s time, the length of trains was increased from
an average of 5,741 feet in 2018 to 6,008 feet in 2019. Additionally, 175 locomotives
and 2,000 railcars were removed from service, and the KCS reduced its total number of
employees from 2018 to 2019 by 160 people. (21) However, as the Kansas City Southern
Railway does not host Amtrak trains, it is included in the paper only to provide background
information on Class One freight railroad experience with PSR.
BNSF Railway
The BNSF Railway is the lone holdout of the Class One railroads not to implement Precision
Scheduled Railroading. The former CEO of the BNSF, Matt Rose, has said,
A PSR method that seeks about $125 million in cost savings from every thousand
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employees cut isn’t thinking long-term, as it often ignores service disruptions to
customers. Disengaging from our customers to change internal cost savings is not a
good long-term business strategy. De-marketing tactics can result in unanticipated, but
logical bad publicity outcomes. There is nothing wrong with being a low-cost supplier,
but ignoring your customers until you hit a wall on costs can have understandable
longer-term consequences. (15)
Counter to other railroads’ downsizing strategy, the BNSF is building its railroad network
with new facilities, e.g., recently adding a new logistics center outside of Denver, in order
to grow the company.

POTENTIAL FOR PSR TO AFFECT PERFORMANCE OF INTERCITY
PASSENGER AND HIGH-SPEED RAIL SERVICE
History suggests that the implementation of PSR operating strategies at major freight
railroads may significantly affect the performance of intercity passenger and high-speed
rail service. When Congress enacted the Rail Passenger Service Act (RPSA), the law that
relieved freight railways of their public obligation to provide passenger rail service through
the creation of Amtrak, the freight railroads agreed legally to “grant Amtrak trains preference
over their own freight trains.” However, shortly after the agreement was put in place, the
major freight railroads began selling off their less profitable lines, consolidating their trains
onto more congested main lines, selling equipment, and terminating employees in order
to increase their profits. (1) All of these actions are happening again today as part of PSR.
Interestingly enough, when freight railroads have had to explain the reason for Amtrak train
delays on their system, the host railroads have cited “freight train congestion” as the major
reason for delaying Amtrak trains. (1)
There are two potentially positive effects of PSR operating strategies on the performance
of intercity passenger rail train services. The first is that with PSR bringing more schedule
discipline to the host railroad’s operations, intercity passenger rail service trains should have
better, more reliable access to the host freight railroad’s tracks when scheduled. Also, as the
host railroad runs fewer, longer trains, and moves away from specialized-purpose unit trains
towards mixed-consist, general service trains, there are less delays for all trains operating
on the PSR railroad’s tracks overall, due to trains not having to wait to use tracks until
higher-priority trains pass through the section of track. Therefore, due to the positive effects
of PSR, it can be postulated that intercity passenger rail trains will experience better on-time
performance.
Conversely, there are potentially three negative effects of PSR on intercity passenger
railway service. The first is that PSR creates much longer trains than what was previously
the normal length of long freight trains. Many freight railroad sidings were built to handle onemile long trains, but PSR means that three-mile long trains are common today. These trains
cannot fit in most sidings, so this may mean that passenger trains need to wait in sidings
a greater percent of the time, because they can fit in the sidings, while the up to threemile long freight trains cannot. The second potentially negative aspect of PSR is that due
to having fewer employees and fewer repair facilities, any freight train mechanical failure
may mean key tracks are blocked for longer periods of time, resulting in passenger trains
waiting longer than previously for the blockages to eventually clear and allow the passenger
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trains to continue on their journeys. The third way that PSRT could potentially negatively
affect intercity passenger railway service is that with PSR operating strategies railroads try
to do more with less, including less trackage. While freight trains may have been running
spread out across somewhat parallel routes in the past, with PSR, better asset utilization
means more densely packed mainlines, often mainlines where intercity passenger trains
are operated. As stated in the paper “An Assessment of Railway Capacity,” (6) whether
a section of railroad has a single or double tracks has a major impact on capacity. When
a railroad downsizes a main line track from a double track to a single track with sidings in
order to reduce track maintenance costs, its capacity is not reduced by half, its capacity is
reduced by roughly 75%. Whether PSR freight railroad operating strategies have a positive
effect, negative effect, or no significant effect on intercity passenger and high-speed rail train
on-time performance can be determined from the performance data of the passenger trains.

PSR AND AMTRAK
Amtrak is the nation’s intercity passenger rail service and its current high-speed rail
operator. Their principal business is to provide rail passenger service in the major
intercity travel markets of the United States. Amtrak operates a national rail network
of more than 21,400 route miles serving more than 500 destinations in 46 states, the
District of Columbia, and three Canadian provinces. The Acela Express, Amtrak’s highspeed rail service, travels on the northeast corridor (NEC) between Washington, D.C.,
and Boston, Massachusetts. It travels at a maximum speed of 150 mph on sections of
its route between Boston and New Haven, Connecticut that Amtrak owns. However, its
top speed between New York City and Washington, D.C., is 135 mph, which is also on
publicly-owned tracks. Amtrak is the only railroad in North America to maintain rightof-way for service at speeds more than 125 mph and their engineering forces maintain
more than 350 route-miles of track for 100+ mph service.
The NEC is the busiest railroad segment in North America with approximately 2,200 trains
operating daily over some portion of the Washington, D.C., to Boston route. In Fiscal
Year 2018, customers made 18.3 million trips on the NEC. In addition, nine commuter rail
services operate on the NEC. Amtrak serves 526 stations in the United States and Canada.
In addition, there are 59 stations in the United States where Amtrak owns one or more
station components (i.e., station structure, platform, parking facility) but does not serve the
station. Amtrak owns 18 tunnels consisting of 24 miles of track and 1,414 bridges.
In FY2018, 15.1 million trips were taken on Amtrak’s state-supported services routes,
which each had ridership of one million or more passengers in FY2018:
• Pacific Surfliner service (San Diego–Los Angeles–San Luis Obispo) at 2.9 million;
• Capitol Corridor service (San Jose–Oakland–Sacramento–Auburn) at 1.7 million;
• Keystone service (Harrisburg–Philadelphia) at 1.5 million;
• Empire service (New York–Albany–Buffalo–Toronto) at 1.5 million and
• San Joaquins service (Oakland/Sacramento–Bakersfield) at 1.1 million.
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Four other state supported corridors had ridership greater than 500,000 in FY2018:
• Hiawatha service (Chicago–Milwaukee) at 0.8 million;
• Amtrak Cascades service (Eugene–Portland–Seattle–Vancouver, BC) at 0.8 million;
• Lincoln service (Chicago–St. Louis) at 0.6 million; and
• Downeaster service (Boston–Portland–Brunswick) at 0.5 million.
Amtrak operates 15 long-distance (LD) train routes (more than 750 miles), which accounted
for 14% of ridership (4.5 million trips) in FY2018, with 18% of customers traveling to and/or
from a rural station.
Amtrak is the only intercity passenger transportation service in an increasing number of
communities that lack intercity bus and airline service. Their long-distance trains provide
the only rail service at nearly half of the stations in the Amtrak system and are the only
trains in 23 of the 46 states in the network. Most train-miles traveled by Amtrak on these
routes are on the host railroad tracks owned by freight and commuter railroads. On-time
performance (OTP) on the long-distance routes is the weakest in their network. Customer
OTP (measured as the number of customers arriving on time compared to total customers
traveling by Amtrak train) for LD routes for FY2018 was 43.0%, a decline of 1.7% from
44.7% for FY2017. The primary reason for the delays on most of the LD routes was freight
train interference. Amtrak-owned and/or -maintained property includes:
• NEC: 363 miles of the 457-mile NEC spine which connects Washington, D.C.,
Philadelphia, New York City, and Boston. The NEC is the busiest passenger line in
the country, with trains regularly reaching speeds of 125–150 mph. Two sections of
the NEC are owned by others: (1) the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority
(10 miles) and Connecticut Department of Transportation (46 miles) own 56 miles on
Metro-North Railroad between New Rochelle, New York, and New Haven, CT; and (2)
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts owns 38 miles between the Massachusetts/
Rhode Island border and Boston that is operated and maintained by Amtrak;
• Springfield Line: A 60.5-mile track segment from New Haven, Connecticut, to
Springfield, Massachusetts;
• Harrisburg Line (also known as the Keystone Corridor): The 104.2 miles of track in
Pennsylvania between Philadelphia and Harrisburg rated at speeds up to 110 mph
(177 kph);
• Michigan Line: A 95.6-mile segment of 110 mph (177 kph) track from Porter, Indiana,
to Kalamazoo, Michigan;
• Michigan Right-of-Way: Amtrak also operates, maintains, and dispatches a 135-mile
right of way between Kalamazoo and Dearborn purchased by the state of Michigan
in December 2012; and

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Background and History

10

• Hudson Line: Amtrak leases, operates, maintains and dispatches approximately 94
miles of the CSXT Hudson Line, also known as the Empire Corridor, in New York
state between Poughkeepsie and Hoffmans (near Schenectady).
Outside of the NEC, Amtrak contracts with other railroads for the use of their tracks and
other resources required to operate trains, with incentives for on-time performance. These
host railroads are responsible for the condition of their tracks and for the dispatching on their
tracks. Approximately 72 percent of Amtrak’s train miles are run on tracks owned by the host
railroads. The six largest host railroads for intercity passenger trains in FY2018, by trainmiles traveled, were:
• BNSF Railway with 6.9 million train-miles;
• Union Pacific Railroad with 6.2 million train-miles;
• CSX Transportation with 5.0 million train-miles;
• Norfolk Southern Railway with 2.3 million train-miles;
• Canadian National Railway with 1.4 million train-miles; and
• Metro-North Railroad (not a Class One freight railroad) with 1.3 million train-miles.

EFFECT ON AMTRAK
The authors contacted and participated in meetings and discussions with numerous Amtrak
staff at various levels within Operations, Engineering, and Maintenance departments, plus
their counterparts at New Jersey Transit (NJT) and the Long Island Railroad (LIRR), where
the three agencies share operations along the Northeast Corridor and through the Penn
Station Complex into Queens. Unanimously, all three agencies reported that they did not
believe that the implementation of the PSR operating strategy by host railroads has had a
significant effect on their ability to operate trains. However, Amtrak stated that many of their
trains are delayed by freight carriers for various reasons.
As mentioned above, Amtrak’s network consists of tracks owned, maintained, and dispatched
by freight railroads who “host” Amtrak trains using their tracks. The freight railroads control the
dispatching and decisions on what trains have priority. Federal law requires that Amtrak trains
receive preference over freight trains and that the largest cause of Amtrak delays is due to
freight train interference (Figure 3) causing Amtrak to wait until the freight trains operate first.
Amtrak reports that the host railroads typically achieve good Amtrak performance especially
on the Northeast Corridor where freight movements are more prevalent at night, however a
recent past study revealed that Amtrak could realize a one-time savings of $336 million, and
annual savings of approximately $42 million if the railroad were permitted to operate reliably
despite the financial incentives they offered. Therefore, the performance of Amtrak is greatly
dependent upon it freight host railroads.
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III. RESULTS
To determine the effects of PSR on Amtrak’s Intercity passenger rail service, it is necessary
to understand the host railroads. It is important to consider the total minutes of delay that
the host freight railroads cause Amtrak, as well as the percentage of Amtrak trains that are
on-time, viewed over time. PSR was gradually accepted by the major freight railroads, so
knowing the year when PSR was first implemented at a railroad helps with the understanding
of any significant changes to the performance of passenger service over time.

“HOST-RESPONSIBLE DELAY MINUTES PER 10,000 TRAIN-MILES”
Historically Amtrak evaluates host performance based on “host responsible delay minutes per
10,000 train-miles” which is the measure of delay caused to Amtrak trains. This measurement
is normalized (means and standard deviation) of the number of miles traveled by each train
so that different routes and hosts are compared. Then Amtrak assigns letter grades of A,
B, C, D, or F for each host railroad based on these delays, and reports these grades on
its website. For this research, Amtrak provided data for the years 2000 to 2019 concerning
the performance of each of the five Class One freight railroads that host Amtrak passenger
services. The key performance data listed in Table 2 was provided by Amtrak.
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This information is also presented in Figure 1 in order to show a comparison of the
performances of each Class One freight host railroad host over the time period of 2000
through 2019. Note that BNSF has never instituted PSR, and also that the railroad has
the least number of minutes of Amtrak train delay per 10,000 train-miles over the course
of the past twenty years. The BNSF service level has remained relatively constant during
the period studied, with a minimum delay rate of 614 minutes and a maximum rate of
only 1,269 minutes. Also, the BNSF has had the most consistently good service with the
smallest standard deviation for the rate of delay for the railroads, as shown in Table 3.

Figure 1. Delay of Amtrak’s Trains Measured in Minutes per 10,000 Train-Miles for
Each Class One Host Railroad
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Comparison of Host Delay Rates for Each Class One Freight Railroad
Host of Amtrak
Host Railroad Minutes of Delay per 10,000 Train-Miles
min

max

variance

std. dev.

614

1,269

655

29,776

167.41

CN

2,265

5,837

3,572

1,341,416

1123.61

CP

1,209

4,247

3,038

638,435

775.16

CSX

989

1,760

771

58,999

235.64

NS

897

1,961

1,065

98,257

304.10

UP

871

4,200

3,329

737,156

832.94

BNSF

range

The Amtrak data allows a comparison of the host railroad’s performance in the years before
its implementation of PSR and its performance afterwards using PSR. The Canadian
National Railway was the first railroad to adopt PSR in 1998, but data was not available for
the years prior to 2000, so a before-and-after comparison is not possible. The next railroad
to institute PSR was the CP in 2012. Examining the data for the CP, prior to implementing
PSR the railroad had reached a maximum of 4,247 minutes of delay, but after PSR was
implemented, the CP’s minutes of delay rate has shrunk significantly, down to 1,209 minutes
in 2019. The CSX implemented PSR in 2017, and it has experienced a significant decrease
in minutes of delay, decreasing from a rate of 1,348 minutes in 2015 down to 989 in 2019,
the best amongst the Class One freight railroads. The NS put PSR into effect in 2018.
Before that time NS had a its minutes of delay rate has held steady since then, without a
significant increase or decrease. Finally, the UP instituted PSR also in 2018. While over the
course of 20 years, the UPS has had times of poor performance delaying Amtrak’s trains,
since 2010, UP’s delay rate has held somewhat steady, being 1,160 minutes last year, the
third best of the group of railroads.

ON-TIME PERFORMANCE
Another measure of the quality of intercity passenger railway service is “On-Time
Performance.” Table 4 shows each route of Amtrak that is hosted by one or more Class
One freight railroads, the host railroad or railroads, and the percentage of trains on each
route that are considered to have arrived within 15 minutes of their scheduled arrival times,
for the years 2002 to 2019. For the routes where BNSF is the primary railroad by mileage—
Cascades, Empire Builder, Heartland Flyer, San Joaquins, and Southwest Chief—the
performance has held somewhat steady and currently averages 56.8% of trains on-time.
When the CN is the sole host, such as with of the City of New Orleans (73%) service the
results are acceptable. When the CN is the secondary or tertiary host, such as with the
Michigan Wolverine (27%), and the Texas Eagle (27%), the on-time performance of trains
suffers. However poor the performance, the CN has been operating with PSR since before
the first year of data examined, so it is hard to draw conclusions as to whether or not PSR
is the cause of their poor performance.
The CP is the sole host for the Hiawatha (92%), and it is the secondary host of the Empire
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Builder (47%), averaging 69.5%, but for the Empire Builder, the CP operates less than
one-sixth of its route miles. However, the performance of the Hiawatha averaged 93.5%
prior to the CP’s implementation of PSR in 2012, and has averaged 93.6% with PSR,
suggesting that PSR has had no effect on passenger train service.
CSX is the primary or sole host of eight routes—the Cardinal (55%), Carolinian (64%),
Lake Shore Ltd (48%), Silver Star (34%), Auto Train (54%), Empire / New York (66%),
Palmetto (63%), and Silver Meteor (44%)—averaging out to 53.5% for 2019. CSX is the
secondary host on the Capitol Limited with an on-time performance of 31% in 2019, and
on that route, it operates about two-fifths of the total route miles. Considering the five
immediate years prior to the year 2017, when CSX started using PSR concepts, and the
data since then, the rates did not significantly change for five routes: the Palmetto (63%),
Silver Meteor (44%), the Cardinal (55%), the Carolinian (64%), and the New York route to
Albany (66%). However, for three routes—Lake Shore Limited (48%), Silver Star (34%),
and the Auto Train (54%)—there has been a small decrease in on-time performance.
The Norfolk Southern is the primary or sole host railroad for five routes: the Michigan
/ Wolverine (27%), Capitol Limited (31%), Crescent (31%), Pennsylvanian (70%), and
Piedmont (75%). On all five routes the NS has seen on-time performance significantly
worsen since their start of PSR in 2018. NS is also the secondary host on four routes—the
Cardinal (55%), Carolinian (64%), Lake Shore Ltd (48%), and Silver Star (34%), where
each has held steady—with the exception being the Silver Star, of which NS is a very small
part.
Lastly, the Union Pacific Railroad is the sole or primary host for seven routes: California
Zephyr (33%), Coast Starlight (51%), Pacific Surfliner (73%), Sunset Ltd (21%), Texas
Eagle (27%), Capitol Corridor (87%), and Missouri / River Runner (63%). The year of
implementation of PSR at UP was 2018. Considering the range of the five years prior
to 2018 through the present, the on-time performance of every one of those routes has
decreased significantly. Also, the UP is the secondary host for the Cascades (63%) and
the San Joaquins (64%) routes, and on both of those routes the on-time performance has
significantly decreased.
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IV. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
The results are mixed but when considering the measure of “Host Railroad Minutes of
Delay per 10,000 Train-Miles” suggests that PSR may be able to improve a railroad’s
ability to reduce delays of the Amtrak passenger trains that it hosts. Of the five railroads
that implemented PSR, one has worsened its minutes of delay rate, two railroads have
experienced no significant changes, and two railroads have experienced significant
improvements. Alternatively, considering “On-Time Performance” measures suggests that
PSR strategies have the potential to worsen a host railroad’s performance. Setting aside
the CN, which began PSR prior to the earliest year of data, of the other five railroads,
the BNSF, CP, and CSX metrics showed no significant difference. However, after PSR
strategies were initiated at the Union Pacific and the Norfolk Southern, the two railroads’
on-time performance worsened noticeably.
Therefore, the results of the study suggest that if implemented properly, PSR strategies
will have no effect on a freight railroad’s ability to host Amtrak intercity and high-speed
rail passenger railway service, but that if implemented incorrectly, the host railroad can
negatively affect Amtrak’s train performance.
Furthermore, if PSR-related double track removals are found to have reduced capacity
in a section of mainline to the point that on-time performance of passenger trains suffers
significantly, restoring the second main track may alleviate the problem. A potential source
of funding for such double track restorations would be the Federal Railroad Administration’s
Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements (CRISI) Program.
However, if there are already two or more tracks in a section of main line, there are
diminishing returns as additional tracks are added, and therefore building more tracks
alone may not solve the on-time performance problem. For example, research has shown
that a four-track main line section only has a capacity that is roughly 50% better than two
tracks. (6) In such a case, the only solution may be to raise the penalties paid by the host
freight railroad for late passenger trains to ensure that passenger trains truly do receive the
highest priority from the freight railroad’s dispatcher, as is required by law.
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